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Abstract 
This paper examines the characteristics of dividend paying firms in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina. The research is conducted on a sample of 35 largest public firms during 
the period of five years, from 2013 to 2017, using multiple linear regression and logistic 
regression. The aim of the research is to explore the internal determinants of dividend 
payouts and to find whether there are any deviations from empirical experiences in 
the world. The research results show that larger and more profitable firms are more 
likely to pay dividends, while more indebted and closely held firms are less likely to pay 
dividends. The negative relation found between the dividend decision and 
investment opportunities is not statistically significant. The research results also show 
that the size is positively associated with higher payout ratios, while the payout ratios 
decrease with greater use of financial leverage. Profitability, investment opportunities 
and ownership concentration do not affect the level of dividend distribution. 
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Analyzing the phenomenon of dividends, Black (1976) famously stated: "The harder 
we look at the dividend picture, the more it seems like a puzzle, with pieces that just 
don’t fit together". Incentive for such a statement probably came from conflicting 
theoretical perspectives and mixed results of previous empirical research regarding 
the link between dividends and firm value. However, vast number of previous research 
identified the main characteristics of dividend paying firms - profitability, size, growth 
opportunities, leverage, and ownership concentration. Even though research results 
were not uniform, profitability and size in general have a positive effect on the level of 
dividends, while the leverage, growth opportunities and ownership concentration 
have a negative effect on dividend distribution. The purpose of this paper is to verify 
those findings in case of Bosnia and Herzegovina by analyzing the internal factors of 
dividend policy in the public firms listed on the Sarajevo and Banja Luka Stock 
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literature and the previous empirical research of the internal factors of dividend policy. 
The second part of the paper describes the design of the sample, the sources of data 
and the choice of the research methods. The third part of the paper presents 
descriptive statistics as well as hypothesis testing results. The fourth part of the paper 




According to literature, the most important internal factors of dividend policy are 
profitability, size, growth opportunities, indebtedness of the company and ownership 
concentration. Even though the effects of these factors are not geographically 
consistent, as stated above, profitability and size in general have positive effects on 
dividends while the leverage, growth opportunities and ownership concentration 
negatively affect dividend decision. A detailed review of the previous research results 
regarding the internal determinants of dividend policy is given below. 
Retained and current earnings are the basic accounting sources for dividends, and 
it is intuitively expected that the growth in earnings per se will be followed by the 
growth of dividends. This is confirmed by numerous empirical studies. Lintner (1956) 
examined the dividend policy of 28 major US firms and found that current earnings 
and previous year's dividends are main determinants of actual dividends. Fama and 
Babiak (1968) also came to this conclusion on a sample of 392 industrial firms in United 
States through the period from 1946 to 1964. They have pointed out that current 
earnings are better indicator of profitability compared to cash flow or net profit plus 
depreciation, included in the model as a separate variable. These findings are 
consistent with signalling theory that states that profitable firms will pay dividends in 
order to signal good business prospects (Bhattacharya, 1979). 
 The importance of earnings for dividend decision is also confirmed through a 
number of surveys. Baker et al. (1985) conducted a survey in 318 firms from the New 
York Stock Exchange and found that the most important factors of dividend payouts 
were the expected earnings and the historical dividend payout pattern. Similar 
conclusions were reached in a survey of NASDAQ firms conducted by Baker et al. 
(2001). Furthermore, investigating factors that influence dividend decision on a sample 
of 384 financial directors in 256 US firms Brav et al. (2005) found that dividend decision 
is in the range with investment decision, while the stock buybacks are made from the 
residual cash flow after investments. In addition, the authors found that the perceived 
stability of future earnings is still an important factor of dividend policy even though 
the link between earnings and dividends has faded over time. The reason for this, as 
authors pointed out, is that majority of directors favour the stock buybacks over 
dividends as a more flexible option of earnings distribution. 
 Apart from profitability as main determinant of dividend payout, numerous 
empirical studies suggest that dividend decision is also affected by other financial 
factors like investment opportunities, size, and leverage. Rozeff (1982) found that 
higher investment opportunities (growth rate of revenues) are associated with lower 
dividend payouts. This is in line with pecking order theory (Myers, Myluf, 1984) that refers 
to a hierarchy-based approach to financing in which retained earnings are 
considered as the cheapest source of funds. Therefore, firms with strong investment 
opportunities i.e. firms in the early phase of life-cycle are more likely to retain higher 
portion of earnings and therefore pay lower dividends (DeAngelo, DeAngelo, Stulz, 
2006). Rozeff (1982) also found negative relation between firm leverage (beta 
coefficient) and dividends. The reason for this is contractual obligation to pay interest 
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portion of debt in firm capital structure leads to higher financial risk. Therefore, 
retention of earnings is often perceived as a protection against default risk. Lloyd et 
al. (1985) investigated the relationship between the dividend payouts and the firm 
characteristics identical to those used by Rozeff (1982) adding the size of the firm as 
an additional factor for dividend payout. The results of the research have shown a 
positive link between the firm size and the dividend payouts. Holder, Langrehr and 
Hexter (1998) also investigated the determinants of dividend policy on a sample of 
477 US firms in the period from 1983 to 1990. They have documented a strong link 
between the dividend payout ratios and the size of the firm measured by the 
logarithm of the sales revenue. The reason for this is that bigger firms usually have 
easier access to the capital markets what makes them less sensitive on internal source 
of financing and allows them to pay higher dividends. This is in line with life cycle theory 
of dividends because as firms grow mature they tend to have higher portion of 
retained earnings in total capital what makes them good candidates for dividend 
payout due to better profitability and weaker investment opportunities (DeAngelo, 
DeAngelo, Stulz, 2006). Moreover, a study conducted by Fama and French (2001) 
showed declining percentage of dividend payers among publicly listed firms due to 
decreasing propensity to pay dividends and growing portion of small firms with low 
profitability and strong growth opportunities that are typical characteristics of non-
payers. By using logistic regression, they assigned higher probability of dividend 
payout to firms with higher profits and lower growth opportunities. 
 Similar conclusions regarding the link between dividends and firm level factors like 
profitability, size, leverage, and investment opportunities were reached in empirical 
studies of dividend policy across Europe. However, some researchers found mixed 
results across different countries. Hedensted and Raaballe (2006) examined the 
dividend policy in Denmark and found that typical characteristics of dividend payers 
are: large firm size, positive earnings, high and stable ROE, high retained earnings and 
the fact that firm paid out dividends in the previous year. Statescu (2006) studied the 
factors of dividend policy in Switzerland and documented that price volatility, market-
to-book ratios, and leverage are negatively associated with dividend payouts, while 
profitability, firm size and institutional holdings positively affect the level of dividends. 
Kowalewski, Stetsyuk, and Talavera (2007) investigated dividend determinants in 
Poland and found that larger (log of total assets) and more profitable (ROA) firms 
without solid investment outlook pay more dividends, while more indebted firms (ratio 
of long term debt to assets) and those with better investments (Tobin’s q) pay lower 
dividends. Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003) documented significant negative influence of 
firm’s size (log of total assets) and leverage (debt to total assets) on dividend payout 
ratios (total dividends divided by income before extraordinary items) among German 
firms. Negative link found between dividend payout ratios and investment 
opportunities (Tobin’s q) was not significant. Kožul and Orsag (2012) examined the 
determinants of dividend policy in Finland, France, Poland, Netherlands, United 
Kingdom, Australia, USA and Japan. They have found significant positive influence of 
profitability (ROA) and stability of earnings (log of standard deviation of ROA) on 
dividend payout levels, while the growth opportunities and ownership concentration 
had negative effect. Results regarding the influence of debt and size were inconsistent 
across countries. Kožul and Mihalina (2013) examined the dividend determinants of 
publicly listed firms in Croatia and documented that payout ratios are associated with 
higher levels of profitability and lower levels of debt, while stability of earnings and firm 
size effects were not statistically significant. 
 Similar results were reached in the rest of the world. Bebczuk (2004) explored 
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1996-2002. He found that bigger (log of sales) and more profitable firms (return on 
assets – ROA) without good investment opportunities (Tobin’s q) distribute higher 
dividends, while riskier and more indebted firms (debt to assets ratio) pay lower 
dividends. Aivazian, Booth and Cleary (2003) have explored the dividend policy of 
firms in developing countries (South Korea, Malaysia, Jordan, Turkey, Pakistan, India, 
Thailand and Zimbabwe). They have documented that profitability (ROE) positively 
affects dividend payout ratios (the ratio of total dividends and assets) in all of the 
analyzed countries, while debt and payout ratios move in the opposite direction. 
Unexpectedly, research has shown a positive relationship between dividend 
payments and the market to book ratio as an approximation of the present value of 
growth opportunities. Negative link between the dividend payout ratios and the size 
of tangible assets found among emerging countries was also surprising having in mind 
previous studies that resulted in positive effects of firm size. However, authors 
concluded that same factors affect dividends decision in emerging countries as well 
as in United States, while magnitudes of these effects are different. Payout ratios of 
emerging market firms are more sensitive to levels of debt indicating stronger financial 
constraints in emerging countries due to a greater reliance on bank debt (Aivazian, 
Booth, Cleary, 2003). The same is true for profitability – payout ratios of emerging 
market firms are more responsive to changes of ROE. Denis and Osobov (2007) also 
investigated the internal factors of dividend policy in six countries (USA, United 
Kingdom, Canada, France, Germany and Japan) during the period from 1994 to 2002. 
They have shown that profitable firms (measured as the ratio of earnings before 
interest and book value of total assets and as the ratio of after-tax earnings to book 
value of equity) are more likely to pay dividends. The same effect was found between 
book value of total assets, as proxy for firm size, and dividend payout ratios. However, 
the link between dividends and growth opportunities has not been consistent across 
countries. Firms in the United States, Canada and the United Kingdom were more likely 
to pay out dividends as they had fewer growth opportunities, while in the case of 
Germany, France and Japan, higher growth opportunities were characteristic of firms 
that paid more dividends. Authors used the market to book value and the percentage 
change in total assets as indicators of growth opportunities. 
 However, dividend determinants are not exclusively financial. According to 
agency theory, dividend decision is also affected by ownership structure. From the 
agency theory perspective, ownership concentration and dividend distribution can 
be viewed as substitutes. Jensen and Meckling (1976) argue that managers often tend 
to pursue their own goals at the expense of the stockholder’s interests. In order to 
minimize agency costs shareholders will strive to prevent misuse of free cash flow. This 
can be done by using legal mechanisms to force dividend payouts or by increasing 
the ownership stake to gain more control over management actions. As Shleifer and 
Vishny (1997) emphasized - the most effective way to match cash flow and control 
rights of outside investors is to increase holdings. So, one can expect that firms with 
higher ownership concentration will pay lower dividends because increased control 
enables them full "consumption" of ownership rights. This was observed by Rozeff (1982) 
who found that higher inside ownership is associated with a reduced dividend payout 
ratio. Similar results were presented by Gugler and Yurtoglu (2003), as well as 
Kowalewski, Stetsyuk and Talavera (2007), who documented that bigger stake of the 
largest owner is related to lower dividend payout ratio, while the larger holding of the 
second largest owner is linked to higher dividend pay-out ratio. Kožul and Orsag (2012) 
also documented negative relation between dividend payouts and ownership 
concentration measured by the holdings of the larger shareholder. On the other hand, 
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dividends to reduce the likelihood of irrational spending, especially in countries with 
strong investor protection. This was confirmed by study of La Porta et al. (2000) who 
found that dividends are output of strong investor protection i.e. higher dividend 
payout ratios are found in countries with stronger investor protection. This is also in line 
with earlier works of La Porta et al. (1998, 1999) who documented that countries with 
stronger investor protection have more dispersed ownership structure. 
 
Research data and methodology 
The final research sample consists of the 35 largest nonfinancial firms listed on the 
Sarajevo and Banja Luka Stock Exchange. Research period is five years (2013-2017). 
All publicly listed nonfinancial firms with market capitalization higher than 10 million 
BAM, that have minimum of 30 shareholders, available accounting data for entire 
research period and positive book capital entered the sample. Sample selection 
process according to the research criteria is presented in table 1. 
 
Table 1 Number of analyzed firms by stock exchanges 
1 Sarajevo Stock Exchange 
55 Number of firms with market capitalization greater than 10 million BAM 
-17 Financial firms 
-8 Less than 30 shareholders 
-6 Inconsistent or missing accounting data 
-2 Negative book capital 
22 Number of analyzed firms listed on Sarajevo Stock Exchange 
2 Banja Luka Stock Exchange 
28 Number of firms with market capitalization greater than 10 million BAM 
-12 Financial firms 
-1 Less than 30 shareholders 
-1 Inconsistent or missing accounting data 
-1 Negative book capital 
13 Number of analyzed firms listed on Banja Luka Stock Exchange 
35 Final sample – total (1+2) 
Source: Authors' creation. 
 
 Financial firms are excluded from the sample due to unique operating 
characteristics and specific regulatory framework. Furthermore, firms with less than 30 
shareholders are excluded from the sample because they cannot be considered as 
true public firms. Inconsistent accounting data refers to cases with missing or distorted 
data on research variables. Firms with negative book capital are also excluded from 
the sample due to violation of going concern assumption. For the research purposes, 
a binary logistic regression is used. The dependent variable is binary and equals 1 if a 
firm pays dividend in year t, and 0 otherwise. Independent research variables are 
profitability, size, investment opportunities, leverage, ownership concentration and 
government ownership.  
 Government ownership is included as additional control variable due to a large 
portion of firms with significant stake held by government entities and institutions. In 
addition, linear regression is used to test how these factors influence payout ratios 
among dividend payers. Variable definitions and hypothesized signs between 
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Table 2 Variables in regressions 
Variable name Variable definition Hyp. sign 
Dividend payer 
Payout ratio 
1 for payers, 0 otherwise (PAYER) 
Dividends to earnings ratio (DIV PR) n.a. 
Profitability Return on equity (ROE) + 
Size Natural logarithm of total assets (LSIZE) + 
Leverage Ratio of total liabilities to total assets (LEVERAGE) - 
Growth opportunities Sales revenue growth rate (SGROWTH) - 
Ownership concentration 
Government ownership 
Percent of holdings by top 5 shareholders (TOP5) 
1 for government owned, 0 otherwise (GOV) - 
Source: Authors' creation. 
 
 Profitability is measured by return on equity (ROE), size by the logarithm of total 
assets (log of total assets), growth opportunities by growth rate of sales revenue, 
leverage by the ratio of liabilities to total assets and ownership concentration by 
percentage of ownership held by top 5 shareholders. A firm in which government has 
more than 50% ownership rights equals 1 and 0 otherwise. Financial data are extracted 
from annual reports of the analyzed firms. Additionally, ownership data are collected 
from Registry of securities of Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina and Central 
Registry of Securities of Republic of Srpska. 
 
Results and discussion 
Table 3 (and figure 1) presents frequencies of dividend paying and non-paying firms 
as well as average payout ratios across years. Adjusted payout ratio is the ratio of 
dividends to earnings excluding observations with payout ratios greater than one i.e. 
distribution of dividends from retained earnings in previous years (in some cases even 
before sample period). As table 3 shows, portion of dividend payers varies from 26% in 
2013 to 37% in 2014, with overall average of 30%. Those payers on average distributed 
large portion of earnings to their shareholders (even if payout ratios above one are 
excluded). The average adjusted payout ratio is 59% which is significantly higher than 
5-year average payout ratio of S&P 500 firms of 38% (Damodaran, 2019a). This is the 
opposite of Glen et al. (1995) who found that dividend payout ratios in emerging 
markets are only two thirds of those in developed capital markets. Moreover, including 
those observations with payout ratio greater than one, average payout ratio increases 
to level of 378%. 
Table 4 summarizes the descriptive statistics of the research variables for dividend 
payers and non-payers. Firm year observations with payout ratio greater than 1, as 
well as those observations with negative earnings are excluded. Return on equity 
(ROE) as proxy for profitability is significantly greater among dividend payers. However, 
this is much lower compared to average ROE of S&P 5000 nonfinancial firms, which is 
16.88% (Damodaran, 2019b). Moreover, at these levels of ROE majority of the most 
profitable public firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina do not add value to their 
shareholders (Orsag, Džidić 2018a, 2018b). They found that most of the analyzed firms 
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Figure1 Proportions of payers and non-payers, and average payout 
ratios across years 
Source: Authors' creation. 
 
Table 3 Frequencies of dividend payers across years 
 Year   
  2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 Total 
No. of dividend paying firms 9 13 12 10 9 53 
 % of total firms 0.26 0.37 0.34 0.29 0.26 0.30 
 Mean payout ratio 2.30 2.82 1.51 0.76 13.01 3.78 
 Mean adjusted payout ratio 0.84 0.58 0.64 0.51 0.36 0.59 
S$P mean payout ratio 0.33 0.34 0.43 0.43 0.39 0.38 
No. of non-dividend paying firms 26 22 23 25 26 122 
 % of total firms 0.74 0.63 0.66 0.71 0.74 0.70 
Total number of firms 35 35 35 35 35 175 
Total% 100 100 100 100 100 100 
Source: Authors' calculation based on data from financial reports and Damodaran (2019a). 
 
 Variable size, measured by the total assets of the firm is also significantly higher for 
dividend payers versus non-payers, which means that smaller firms are less likely to pay 
dividends. These results follow the pecking order theory of Myers and Majluf (1984) who 
show that firms often refuse to raise capital and forego valuable investment 
opportunities due to asymmetric information or higher transaction costs. Reasoning 
behind this fact is that raising capital is more expensive for smaller firms so they will rely 
on internal sources thus reducing the likelihood to pay dividends.  
 Table 4 presents aggregate descriptive statistics of the research variables, while 
tables containing descriptive statistics for each year separately are provided in 
Appendix 1. 
As expected, growth rate of sales, as proxy for investment opportunities, is two times 
higher across non-payers (8%) versus dividend payers (3%). Combined with fact that 
profitable firms pay more dividends these results are aligned with the agency theory 
of Easterbrook (1984) and Jensen (1986) who emphasize the role of dividends in 
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Table 4 Descriptive statistics of the research variables 
Payers 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 43 0.59 0.36 0.04 1.00 
Return on equity 43 0.09 0.11 0.001 0.57 
Return on assets 43 0.07 0.07 0.0009 0.37 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 43 612.29 862.18 31.76 3,406.49 
Total liabilities / total assets 43 0.14 0.11 0.00 0.36 
Top 5 shareholders 43 0.80 0.17 0.48 0.99 
Top 1 shareholder 43 0.55 0.25 0.14 0.93 
Growth of sales 36 0.03 0.17 -0.30 0.60 
Non-payers 
Variable Obs. Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 89 - - - - 
Return on equity 89 0.04 0.06 0.0001 0.38 
Return on assets 89 0.03 0.07 0.0001 0.59 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 89 213.91 436.47 3.55 3,398.58 
Total liabilities / total assets 89 0.26 0.22 0.001 0.79 
Top 5 shareholders 89 0.87 0.14 0.38 0.99 
Top 1 shareholder 89 0.63 0.20 0.10 0.95 
Growth of sales 70 0.08 0.28 -0.44 0.97 
Source: Authors' calculation based on data from financial reports. 
 
 Like investment opportunities, dividend-paying firms are significantly less indebted 
than non-payers are. However, debt figures show that public firms in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are, in general, mainly financed by equity rather than debt despite the 
fact that bank average interest rates have been at the lowest levels in the last five 
years(Banking Agency of the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, 2019). Moreover, 
Orsag and Džidić (2018a) documented the poor use of financial leverage among the 
most profitable public firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. They found that 10 out of 30 
profitable firms, do not use debts at all, neither long-term nor short-term. On the total 
value of the principal come only 7.84% of the debt, equally divided between long-
term and the short-term debt. 
 By looking at Table 4 it is easy to see that majority of public firms in Bosnia and 
Herzegovina are closely held. Average percentage of holdings of top 5 shareholders 
is very high among payers and non-payers (above 80%), while the biggest shareholder 
on average holds more than 50% of shares in both groups of firms. However, top 5 
holdings are slightly higher among non-payers. High ownership concentration is direct 
consequence of slow pace of privatization process launched in late 1990s. According 
to ownership data, the government controls (over 50% ownership rights) 49% of 
dividend payers. Having in mind weak investor protection enforcement, statistics 
presented here also points to possibility of free cash flow expropriation by controlling 
owner at the expense of outside shareholders. Therefore, it is possible that ownership 
concentration among firms without significant government stake acts like substitute 
for weak investor protection.  
Differences between payers and non-payers are also visible on annual basis. Payers 
have higher ROE in four out 5 years, while ROA is higher for payers in each year. 
Furthermore, payers are consistently bigger (total assets) than non-payers throughout 
the whole research period. In contrast, dividend payers have lower investment 
opportunities (sales growth) and lower leverage (debt ratio) in each of the sample 
years. Similarly, ownership concentration measured by top five shareholders and by 
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statistics for each year in Appendix 1 displayed in tables A1, A2, A3, A4 and A5 for 
payers, and A6, A7, A8, A9 and A10 for non-payers). 
 
Logistic regression results 
Table 5 summarizes the logistic regression odds ratios, coefficients and t statistics 
showing the odds and marginal effects of independent research variables on the 
likelihood that a firm pays dividend. Firm-year observations with payout ratio greater 
than one, as well as those observations with negative earnings, are excluded from the 
sample. By including those observations coefficients would still have the same sign 
and would still be statistically significant. 
 
Table 5 Logistic regression results on a sample of 35 listed firms (106 firm-year 
observations) 
Variables Odds ratios Coefficients t-statistic 
ROE 2.45e+18*** 42.342*** 4.11 
LSIZE 7.604*** 2.028*** 3.73 
LEVERAGE 0.002* -6.010* -2.24 
TOP5 5.14e-06*** -12.178*** -4.02 
GOV 0.388 -0.945 -0.91 
SGROWTH 0.060 -2.806 -1.01 
_cons 1.04e-13 ** -29.894** -3.21 
N = 106 *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Log likelihood = -26.975047 Pseudo R2 = 0.6029 
LR chi2(6) = 81.90 Prob > chi2 = 0.0000 
Area under the ROC curve = 96,50%  
Note: ROE is defined as return of equity, LSIZE as logarithm of total assets, leverage as the ratio 
between total liabilities and total assets, TOP5 as holdings of 5 largest shareholders, SGROWTH 
as the percentage growth of sales. GOV is binary variable that equals 1 if government has 
more 51% of ownership rights and 0 otherwise. 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
 Logistic regression results confirm differences in research variables among payers 
and non-payers. By looking in the table 5 it is easy to see that more profitable and 
larger firms are more likely to pay dividends, while more indebted firms and those with 
higher ownership concentration are less likely to pay dividends. Investment 
opportunities (growth of sales) as well as government ownership do not affect the 
likelihood of dividend distribution. Selected variables, except sales growth and 
ownership concentration, seem to be good classifiers that lead to more accurate 
discrimination of firms between payers and non-payers (area under the ROC curve = 
96.50%). Presented goodness of fit measures (Pseudo R2 and LRchi2) also indicate that 
overall model is statistically significant. This is in line with the previous research about 
characteristics of dividend paying firms that have shown that both profitability and 
size in general, positively affect the dividend decision, while debt and ownership 
concentration have a negative impact on their dividend distribution.  
 
Linear regression results 
Table 6 presents multiple linear regression results conducted on unbalanced panel 
data (among dividend payers). Pooled OLS model is used due to the small number of 
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 Model equation is: 
𝐷𝐼𝑉𝑃𝑅𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1𝑅𝑂𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽2𝐿𝑆𝐼𝑍𝐸𝑡𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽3𝐿𝐸𝑉𝐸𝑅𝐴𝐺𝐸𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽4𝑇𝑂𝑃5𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽5𝐺𝑂𝑉𝑖𝑡 + 
+ 𝛽6𝑆𝐺𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑇𝐻𝑖𝑡 + εit , 
(1) 
 
where 𝑖 denotes each firm and 𝑡 denotes time period. Model hypotheses are defined 
in table 2, while linear regression results are presented in table 6. Firm-year observations 
with payout ratio greater than one, as well as those observations with zero dividends 
or negative earnings are excluded from the sample. 
 
Table 6 Linear regression results on a sample of 14 listed firms (36 firm-year 
observations) 
Variables Coefficients t-statistic 






LSIZE 0.111** 2.99 
LEVERAGE -1.718** -4.26 
TOP5 0.273 0.84 
GOV -0.363* -2.49 
SGROWTH -0.001 -0.00 
_cons -1.388 -2.11 
N = 36, R2 = 0.604 *p< 0.05, **p< 0.01, ***p< 0.001 
Note: PR is the payout ratio defined as dividends to earnings ratio. ROE is defined as return of 
equity, LSIZE as logarithm of total assets, leverage as the ratio between total liabilities and total 
assets, TOP5 as holdings of 5 largest shareholders, SGROWTH as the percentage growth of sales. 
GOV is binary variable that equals 1 if government has more 51% of ownership rights and 0 
otherwise. 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
 As can be seen from the table 6, effects of profitability (ROE), ownership 
concentration (top 5 holdings percentage) and investment opportunities (sales 
growth) on dividend payout ratios are not statistically significant. On the other hand, 
firm size (logarithm of total assets) is associated with higher dividend payout ratios (at 
5% significance level), while financial leverage is associated with lower levels of 
dividend distribution (at 1% significance level). Furthermore, even though logistic 
regression results show that being a government owned firm does not affect the 
likelihood to pay dividends, government firms tend to have lower payout ratios than 
non-government firms (significant at 1% significance level). However, both groups of 
firms do have very high payout ratios. 
 Regression diagnostics are given in table 7 in order to detect potential problems of 
the model and to check if a data set follows linear regression assumptions. The 
normality of the residuals is confirmed with Skewness-Kurtosis test, while the absence 
of multicollinearity is validated through the value of VIF and Tolerance indicator. The 
Breusch - Pagan / Cook - Wisberg test suggests the presence of heteroscedasticity in 
the model (residuals are not homogeneous). To deal with this problem 
heteroscedasticity, robust standard errors are used. Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data confirmed the absence of autocorrelation, while the 
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Table 7 Linear regression diagnostics 
Skewness-Kurtosis test 
Skewness Kurtosis adj chi2 prob>chi2 
0.0631 0.4537 4.18 0.1237 
Breusch-Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test for 
heteroskedasticity 
chi2(1) = 5.78 Prob > chi2 = 0.0162 
Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel 
data 
F (1,5) = 3.882 Prob > F = 0.1059 
Model specification test (Linktest)  _hatsq (t = 0.35) p >|t|= 0.727 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
TOP5 3.85 0.259465 
ROE 3.20 0.312827 
SGROWTH 2.39 0.417735 
GOV 2.26 0.443367 
LSIZE 1.97 0.506422 
LEVERAGE 1.62 0.618540 
Mean VIF 2.55   
Source: Authors' calculation. 
  
 By looking at payout ratios statistics presented in this paper one could think that 
dividend-paying firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina are very generous to their 
shareholders. However, this is somewhat misleading. A closer look at their profitability 
(ROA and ROE) and its comparison with levels of profitability on developed and more 
mature capital markets alters this picture. As noted above, average ROE on mature 
capital market is about 16% and it is almost as twice as high as average ROE of public 
firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Moreover, correlation analysis between profitability 
(ROA, ROE) and dividend payout ratios yields negative correlation (-0.43) at 1% 
significance level. Negative correlation coefficient becomes even higher (-0.72) when 
applied to group of dividend payers owned by government. This means that public 
firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina, especially those under government control, pay less 
when ROEs are high and pay more when ROEs are low. Combined with the notion 
that majority of profitable firms do not use leverage despite historically low levels of 
interest rates, and that they actually lose value for their shareholders (Orsag, Džidić, 
2018a, 2018b) one can conclude that public firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina are not 
so generous to their shareholders despite high payout figures. Having in mind weak 
investor protection along with the fact of “artificially” high payout ratios, especially 
among government owned firms, one could raise the doubt regarding incentives 
behind corporate actions in those firms suggesting that dividend policy may be part 
of broader politic goals rather than maximizing shareholder’s wealth. 
 
Conclusion 
The main goal of this paper was to analyze the determinants of dividend policy among 
public firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Research results suggest that dividend payers 
are more likely to be found among large and profitable firms, while firms that are more 
indebted and those with concentrated ownership are less likely to distribute earnings 
to their shareholders. Hypothesized link between investment opportunities and 
dividend payout ratios found no support in this study. However, selected indicators 
seem to provide good discrimination between dividend payers and non-payers. This 
is in line with previous research regarding internal factors of dividend policy captured 
on developed, mature capital markets. Furthermore, larger firms also tend to have 
higher payout ratios while heavy leveraged firms have lower payout ratios. Profitability, 
ownership concentration and investment opportunities do not affect the level of 
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This research, as well as any other empirical research, has certain limitations. They 
are primarily concerned with number of firms that meet research sample criteria. 
Public firms in Bosnia and Herzegovina are limited to those firms that are publicly listed 
as consequence of law enforcement rather than real capital needs. Therefore, small 
number of publicly listed firms makes it impossible to test for industry effects. 
Furthermore, selected measure of sales growth may not be true proxy for investment 
opportunities. Overcoming these limitations by extending the sample size or using 
different research variables would certainly yield more valuable conclusions regarding 
the firm level factors of dividend policy in Bosnia and Herzegovina. 
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Table A1 Descriptive statistics for payers in 2013 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 7 .8411519 .0889959 .75 1 
Return on equity 7 .0523787 .0527917 .0049 .1446 
Return on assets 7 .0459929 .0457196 .0046 .1189 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 7 642.48 429.40 43.69 1,260.83 
Total liabilities / total assets 7 .1006866 .0623913 .019519 .1783805 
Top 5 shareholders 7 .8557143 .1231337 .59 .97 
Top 1 shareholder 7 .6071409 .1966984 .25 .9 
Growth of sales 0         
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Table A2 Descriptive statistics for payers in 2014 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 10 .5763321 .3753954 .087500 .9990771 
Return on equity 10 .0822462 .1039683 .001084 .3232413 
Return on assets 10 .0533017 .0574481 .000954 .1463784 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 10 652.88 1025.80 31.76 3,389.25 
Total liabilities / total assets 10 .1349723 .1289357 0 .3446494 
Top 5 shareholders 10 .77 .1945365 .48 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 10 .496478 .2276067 .144794 .9 
Growth of sales 10 .0215195 .1707348 -.255745 .2590757 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Table A3 Descriptive statistics for payers in 2015 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 11 .6368397 .3774359 .0379523 1 
Return on equity 11 .0927612 .1624217 .0012181 .5665799 
Return on assets 11 .0681063 .1060608 .0010728 .37 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 11 683.70 985.88 43.77 3,389 
Total liabilities / total assets 11 .1382795 .1117028 .018562 .3549896 
Top 5 shareholders 11 .7872727 .1910021 .49 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 11 .5713433 .2748049 .1447939 .93 
Growth of sales 11 .012811 .2337764 -.2962804 .5954944 
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Table A4 Descriptive statistics for payers in 2016 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 9 .5096881 .3729868 .068603 1 
Return on equity 9 .1024801 .0794977 .0042942 .2426131 
Return on assets 9 .0824172 .061869 .0037746 .1940928 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 9 681.76 1100.16 44.18 3,406.49 
Total liabilities / total assets 9 .1584829 .1087022 .0570204 .3586212 
Top 5 shareholders 9 .813284 .1811102 .53 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 9 .566093 .2993725 .1447939 .93 
Growth of sales 9 .0563703 .1082777 -.1000281 .2454158 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Table A5 Descriptive statistics for payers in 2017 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 6 .3571273 .37516 .045179 1 
Return on equity 6 .1301256 .0786033 .0406 .2343229 
Return on assets 6 .1161579 .0702832 .0394862 .2188593 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 6 274.28 294.49 59.58 843.63 
Total liabilities / total assets 6 .1706604 .1109283 .0498155 .3572637 
Top 5 shareholders 6 .8066667 .1618229 .58 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 6 .4791323 .2380162 .1447939 .79 
Growth of sales 6 .0513862 .1735274 -.1932541 .3173661 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Table A6 Descriptive statistics for non-payers in 2013 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 19 - - - - 
Return on equity 19 .0543376 .0948705 .0001756 .3817347 
Return on assets 19 .0334831 .046435 .0001615 .1423659 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 19 329.29 793.78 19.21 3,398.59 
Total liabilities / total assets 19 .2069834 .1671002 .0014482 .5586481 
Top 5 shareholders 19 .8284211 .1790488 .38 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 19 .5886734 .2246695 .1447939 .9 
Growth of sales 0         
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Table A7 Descriptive statistics for non-payers in 2014 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 18 - - - - 
Return on equity 18 .0357891 .0408937 .0003382 .1316541 
Return on assets 18 .0200496 .0236526 .0003366 .0911765 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 18 189.35 291.43  9.75 1,246.52 
Total liabilities / total assets 18 .3057082 .2433646 .0029669 .7840476 
Top 5 shareholders 18 .8822222 .1319784 .39 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 18 .6211111 .1723502 .21 .9 
Growth of sales 18 .0264731 .2276815 -.3908828 .676761 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Table A8 Descriptive statistics for non-payers in 2015 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 12 - - - - 
Return on equity 12 .0469789 .0717061 .0004465 .2409997 
Return on assets 12 .0808191 .1715352 .0003838 .5898746 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 12 103.57 115.16  3.54 397.51 
Total liabilities / total assets 12 .2614582 .2035767 .0024674 .5907189 
Top 5 shareholders 12 .875 .1471239 .43 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 12 .6316667 .2091034 .24 .94 
Growth of sales 12 .0685243 .1560745 -.2067552 .367915 






Croatian Review of Economic, Business and Social Statistics (CREBSS) 
UDK: 33;519,2; DOI: 10.1515/crebss; ISSN 1849-8531 (Print); ISSN 2459-5616 (Online) 
 
 
Vol. 5, No. 2, 2019, pp. 1-16 
 
Table A9 Descriptive statistics for non-payers in 2016 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 20 - - - - 
Return on equity 20 .0249129 .0379267 .0009593 .138588 
Return on assets 20 .0144274 .0210127 .0006874 .0788143 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 20 251.22 319.74  8.10 1,157.72 
Total liabilities / total assets 20 .2689049 .233431 .0017046 .6301174 
Top 5 shareholders 20 .8858142 .1239474 .41 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 20 .6603385 .1909882 .24 .95 
Growth of sales 20 .142557 .35105 -.4371739 .9722494 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
 
Table A10 Descriptive statistics for non-payers in 2017 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Payout ratio 20 - - - - 
Return on equity 20 .0466859 .0532237 .000278 .1871989 
Return on assets 20 .0259519 .0303305 .0001906 .135057 
Total assets (in mln BAM) 20 155.31 269.91  8.08 1,245.50 
Total liabilities / total assets 20 .2803637 .2402301 .0019361 .7924764 
Top 5 shareholders 20 .8975 .1186714 .45 .99 
Top 1 shareholder 20 .6393524 .2088689 .1 .94 
Growth of sales 20 .0857746 .3158722 -.4089707 .8470001 
Source: Authors' calculation. 
